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Abstract 
Many approaches have been adopted to address the problem of terrorism in Nigeria, but none seems to be very 
effective in totally eradicating terrorism and its despicable effects on the safety and well-being of the people. To 
prevent the prevailing cycle of retribution and violence, the author makes a case for the employment of 
restorative justice principles and practice in responding to terrorism. Restorative justice is a contextualized and 
negotiated justice system that seeks to restore a sense of harmony and well-being among all those affected by the 
harmful act. All the primary stakeholders to the conflict, namely the victims, offenders, the affected community 
and relevant governmental agencies must actively participate in the definition of the harm, and the search for a 
resolution acceptable to all concerned. This article examines the military, criminal justice and conciliatory 
counterterrorism models employed by various government administrations in Nigeria starting from the 1980’s 
until the present time. It theoretically analyzes restorative justice and Amalatocracy, as alternative measures to 
countering terrorism in Nigeria. Relying on secondary data from open-source historical documents, existing 
literature, various government sites and other databases, it concludes that a combination of synchronized policies 
that suits the national circumstances of Nigeria could be effective. The findings emphasize the need for 
government leaders, policy makers, and researchers, to support the adoption of the tenets of restorative justice in 
countering terrorism. 
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1. Introduction 
The spread of terrorism and its attendant consequences pose significant security problems to the global 
community, especially the Nigerian national security. The Global Terrorism Database (2020) reported over 
200,000 cases of terrorism worldwide and over 5,060 terrorist attacks in Nigeria from 1970 – 2019. Terrorism 
has undermined the peace, norms, rules, human security and democratic governance of many nation states like 
U.S., Nigeria, India, Syria, Somalia and many other Middle-Eastern and African Countries (Human Rights 
Watch, 2018; U. S. Department of State, 2017; Bhoumik, 2005). Nigeria has witnessed a surge in terrorist 
activities as a result of religious crisis since the Maitatsine uprisings of 1980 in Kano. The situation has 
worsened in the past 12 years because of the religious political, and ethnic violence emanating from the Boko 
Haram and recent Fulani Herdsmen’s uprisings. The Global Terrorism Index, reported Boko Haram as the 
second deadliest terror group in 2019, and the deadliest in sub-Saharan Africa and has caused over 40,600 deaths 
in Nigeria between 2011 and 2021 (Global Terrorism Index, 2020; Campbell, 2021). 
 
Nigeria’s 12 years of terrorist attacks from the dreaded Boko Haram insurgents (a proscribed terrorist group) has 
resulted in the deaths of over 20,000 civilians. From 2009 to 2019, Boko Haram launched over 3035 terrorist 
attacks with over 180 civilians deaths resulting from suicide bomb attacks since late 2016 (Global Terrorism 
Database, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2018). These attacks took place mostly in the North Eastern part of 
Nigeria including the states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, Maiduguri, and Borno state. Council on Foreign Relations 
reported a total of 9,456 violent deaths in Nigeria between October 2011 and October 2013 (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2013). One of Boko Haram’s nefarious attacks was the kidnapping of over 250 Chibok schoolgirls in 
Bornu state which attracted international attention. Terrorist activities in Nigeria has resulted in the displacement 
of over 2.5 million persons, with approximately 8.5 million seeking for humanitarian assistance and the 
displacement of over 240,000 Nigerian refugees to nearby countries (United States Department of State, 2017; 
United States Department of State, 2020).  
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Figure 1. Total Terrorism incidents in Nigeria by years, 1970-2019. Adapted from Global Terrorism Database 
(2020). 
 
The above Figure 1 shows the total number of terrorism incidents in Nigeria from 1970 to 2019 with a total of 
5070 terrorism incidents. The total number of terrorist attacks in Nigeria increase sharply toward the last years of 
the 50 years included in the Global Terrorism Database. There were few or no terrorism incidents in Nigeria 
around the early years from 1970 to 1998. From 1999 until about 2005, the incidents of terrorists’ attacks in 
Nigeria continued to fluctuate at a low rate. From 2006 till 2010, terrorism incidents continued to fluctuate 
mildly. However, from 2011 till the present time, terrorism incidents skyrocketed and have continued to increase 
in the hundreds for a total of 4,723 terrorist incidents within a period of nine years. This is due to the violent 
activities of Boko Haram, which initiated its violent operations around 2006 and became highly violent since 
2011. The largest number of total attacks recorded in a single year in Nigeria (713) took place in 2014. Notably, 
while terrorism incidents in Nigeria continued to skyrocket in the later part of the 50-year period, it dropped 
mildly in 2017 with 488 cases.  
 
Many approaches including various counterterrorist legislations have been adopted to address the problem of 
terrorism in Nigeria. Obviously, counterterrorist legislations should reduce terrorist activities by protecting the 
people and their infrastructure, disrupt terrorist conspiracies, and prevent some potential terrorists’ activities. 
However, these approaches seem not to be very effective in totally eradicating terrorism and its despicable 
effects on the safety and well-being of the people and their properties. To prevent the prevailing cycle of 
retribution and violence, the researcher make a case for the employment of restorative justice principles and 
practice in responding to terrorism. Restorative justice is a contextualized and negotiated justice system that 
seeks to restore a sense of harmony and well-being among all those affected by the harmful act. All the primary 
stakeholders to the conflict, namely the victims, offenders, the affected community and relevant governmental 
agencies must actively participate in the definition of the harm, and the search for a resolution acceptable to all 
concerned. Its underlying assumption is that crime is an act that primarily harms the individual and/or the 
community. Offenders must be held accountable and responsible for the acts that harmed another community 
member and undermined the peace and harmony of the community.  
 
In dealing with the scourge of terrorism, the Nigerian government adopted various legal frameworks such as the 
Nigeria’s Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and the Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act of 2013. These laws 
were created in response to the global war on terrorism and restoration of security in the country. The provisions 
are quite extensive in capturing legislations needed to protect the homeland from the scourge of terrorism, 
though with tendency to violate human rights and fundamental freedoms of people if not properly implemented. 
Apart from the legislative approach, Nigerian government has also employed repressive military and conciliatory 
approaches in responding to terrorism (Owojori1, Balakrishnan, & Muhammad, 2020; Oyewole, 2013). Research 
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shows that most countries including Nigeria easily resort to the use of repressive military measures which in 
principle violates fundamental human rights, rule of law, democratic governance and lacks provisions for 
accountability (Bhoumik, 2005; Hewitt, 1984; Crelinsten & Schmid, 1993). Despite satisfying public’s pressure 
on the government to react to terrorist attacks, the “fire for fire” approach is not a long-term effective strategy to 
handle the security instability in various countries (Bhoumik, 2005; Agbiboa, & Maiangwa, 2014). 
 
Researchers argued that effective counter terrorism measures must go beyond legal and military approaches to 
include structural factors such as political, social, cultural and economic initiatives that would stop radicalization 
ideologies that can trigger violence and terrorism (Crelinsten, 2014). Such strategy addresses the root causes of 
terrorism like hunger, poverty, lack of education, economic marginalization, lack of social amenities etc. It is 
expedient that a workable justice administration strategies are adopted to restore the peace, tranquility and 
security of the people. On that basis, the researcher argues that the “restorative justice philosophy” would 
contribute to a long term panacea to the state of insecurity in Nigeria (Braithwaite, 1989). The researcher’s 
position in this case emanates from the fact that restorative justice is a contemporary approach that puts into 
consideration all stakeholders including meeting the needs of the victims and community and holding offenders 
truly accountable (Elechi, 1999; Zehr 2002; Obi, Okoye, Ewoh & Onwudiwe, 2018). As O’Mahony and Doak 
(2017) contended, there is a need to reimagine the role of restorative justice within modern justice administration 
since orthodox strategies seems ineffective and dysfunctional. 
 
2. Conceptualization of Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
Terrorism and counterterrorism measures have not been easily or clearly defined (Crenshaw, 1992; Lum et al., 
2006; U.S. Department of State, n.d.; Wilkinson, 1986). The concept of terrorism is conceptualized differently 
by different researchers, criminal justice practitioners, evaluators, organizations, government, individuals, and 
international bodies like the United Nations (Onwudiwe, 2001; Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Weinberg, 2005; 
Dyson, 2012; Polland, 2011). Onwudiwe (2001) emphasized on so many dictums used by researchers to define 
terrorism, such as “today’s terrorist is tomorrow’s freedom fighter,” “terrorism to some is heroism to others,” 
and “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (p. 28). For the purposes of this research, terrorism is 
defined according to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 as “criminal acts intended or 
calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political, 
ideological, racial, ethnic and religious purposes” (United Nations, 1994, December 9, para. 3). 
 
On the other hand, counterterrorism is simply defined as government activities, policies or responses designed to 
prevent or thwart all acts of terrorism. According to Stigall et al. (2019, p. 6 & 7), counterterrorism is explained 
as a,  
 
coherent plan to use the instruments of national power to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and their 
networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and to coerce a specific government 
or society to react in accordance with their goals.  
 
Counterterrorism therefore involves strategies employed to defeat all acts of terrorism. Such strategies include 
intelligence gathering, military strikes, hard power, target hardening, criminalization of terrorism, criminal 
prosecution and conviction, profiling, punishment, extradition, diplomacy, policies,  amnesty, monitoring of 
potential terrorists or de-radicalization. 
 
3. Varieties of Counter-terrorism Measures 
3.1. The Military or War Model 
The military or repressive approach views terrorism as a threat to the security of a country. It incorporates the 
“war on terror” approach by physically attacking terrorists in military terms, using maximal force, designed to 
overpower the terrorist (Crelinsten, 2014). The state uses its armed forces to execute counterterrorism strategies 
that involves shooting down suspects, destroying terrorist bases, assassinations, drone strikes, confiscation of 
ammunitions, erratic confrontations, and full-scale deployment of military assets to fight terrorists’ organizations  
(Bhoumik, 2005; Oyewole, 2013; Murtala, 2020). The approach encourages the use of military courts or secret 
tribunals to try terrorist suspects, target hardening, restriction on freedom of movement and freedom of speech, 
curfews, increased arrests, detention without trials, profiling based on ethnicity, religion or country of origin and 
retaliatory strikes against large groups of people where innocent members of the community may become 
victims in the process (Baker & Evans, 2001; Bhoumik, 2005; Gellman & Linzer, 2004; Tams, 2009). According 
to Crelinsten (2014), this type of counterterrorism measure treats terrorism as an act of war which implies that 
the terrorist group is the same as a state. This is in agreement with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which 
approves assassination or confinement of persons without trial during war, so long as the objective is to 
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overpower an adversary combatant like terrorists (Rona, 2005; Crelinsten, 2014). Obviously, this model negates 
the basic principles of justice and due process, lacks government accountability, violates fundamental human 
rights and rules of democracy, and undermines the rules of international law on human rights.  
 
The Nigerian government conceptualized terrorism threat as war against the state and mostly utilize retaliatory 
strikes against terrorists within its country. Obviously, the country is committed to securing its homeland against 
terrorist attacks, without investing in strategies that would restore security and human rights in the long run. 
Nigerian governments have mostly responded to terrorism using the military approach and joint task forces in 
handling major crises in the past (Thurston, 2013). For example, former President Shagari employed the military 
model in quelling the Maitatsine uprising from 1980 through early 1982. In his first administration, Major-
General Muhammadu Buhari, followed a similar approach by invoking repressive ferocity against the Maitatsine 
uprisings in 1983 and 1984 that wiped out the entire group. The Obasanjo’s administration (1999-2007) also 
resorted to the military approach in responding to terrorist activities. Former President Obasanjo continued the 
repressive military attacks by dispatching the Operation Restore Law and Order to the Niger Delta crises. 
Obasanjo also deployed about 3,000 federal troops over clashes between local militants and the police. This 
eventually, resulted in the massacre of an entire community in Odi, Bayelsa state (Watts, 2004). Benue and 
Taraba State also experienced the killing of thousands of community members by military troops due to 
communal conflicts between the two states (Watts, Okonta, Kemedt, & Douglas, 2003). 
 
Under President Yar’adua’s and Goodluck’s administration, several Joint Security Forces (JSF) involving the 
military were employed in 2009 and 2011 to launch aggressive strikes against Boko Haram in the northern 
region of the country (Adesoji, 2010). The joint forces comprised of army, navy, air force, police, State Security 
officers, and paramilitary agencies (Solomon, 2012). In the process of unleashing repressive strategies, the 
various Joint task forces declared states of emergency; launched air strikes; restricted freedom of movement and 
association; conducted stops and searches; arrested suspected terrorists and members of the public without 
warrant; and imposed curfews (Al Jazeera 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Omede, 2011; The Nation, 2011). 
Jonathan’s administration at some point shifted responsibility of counterterrorism to foreign militaries and 
leaders. Thereby declaring international war against Boko Haram (Campbell, 2015).  
 
In the same vein, the present Buhari’s administration maintained the war approach by resuming military training 
relationship with the United States, deployed more troops as was the case by successive government to suppress 
rebels (Campbell, 2015). The Buhari’s war approach can be surmised as follows: international joint task force, 
military reinforcement through constant increase of military expenditure since 2015, declaration of state of 
emergency and curfews, hunting down of terrorists, suspected terrorists and other members of the public, 
establishment of civilian joint task forces and multi-national joint task force and all other repressive tactics 
employed prior to his administration (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014; Murtala, 2020).  
 
3.2. The Criminal Justice Model 
The criminal justice model defines all acts of terrorism as criminal acts and punishes terrorism according to the 
provisions of antiterrorist laws and other related criminal laws of the country. This necessitates the services of 
the three components of the criminal justice system, the police, courts and corrections. Practically, there is 
respect to due process in prosecuting, convicting and punishing terrorists according to the provisions of the law. 
The process of adjudication is strictly followed, starting from detection of a terrorist act, arrest, investigation, 
trial, prosecution, sentencing and incarceration or execution. In addition, the criminal justice model focuses on 
prosecuting of individuals, as opposed to the military model (Bhoumik, 2005). It is expected that this model 
respects human rights, provides accountability, and consistent with democratic principles (Oyewole, 2013). 
However, the definition of terrorist, terrorism and counterterrorism is political and may amount to abuse of 
interpretations to suit political agenda (Meisels, 2009). 
 
The use of the criminal justice model is not very common in Nigeria as terrorists are either arrested and released 
without prosecution (the catch-and-release syndrome) or killed extra-judicially by the law enforcement. The 
coming into effect of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and its Amendment Act of 2013, made provisions to 
deal with the problem of domestic terrorism supposedly following the due process of law in criminalizing 
terrorists. The Act comprehensively defined terrorism, provides measures for the prohibition and punishment of 
acts of terrorism in Nigeria. The Acts gave government agencies like the National Security Adviser and the 
Attorney General broad powers to investigate terrorist activities and prosecute terrorist suspects in any Federal 
High Court of Nigeria. The Act further provided a maximum sentence of death for anyone liable of acts of 
terrorism and specifically forbids acts of terrorism against internationally protected persons. Among others, the 
Acts provided for proscription of terrorist organizations, prohibited participation in any meeting connected with 
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a terrorist group, criminalizes the harboring of terrorists or hindering the arrest of a terrorist or concealment of 
information about terrorist acts, requires communication service providers to intercept and retain 
communications for the purposes of terrorism investigation. Also prohibits financing of terrorism and 
deprivation of Nigerian citizenship on mere suspicion. In matters of urgency, the security or law enforcement 
agencies have the power to conduct search without warrant.  
 
Notable prosecutions during Jonathan’s administration included the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of Ali 
Sanso Konduga (also known as Usman al-Zawahiri), an ex-spokesperson of Boko Haram to three years 
imprisonment after he pled guilty to charges of threatening government officials through text messaging.  
Senator Ali Mohammed Ndume was also charged with four counts for collaborating with Konduga in acts of 
terrorism. Many members of Boko Haram was arrested but and prosecuted (U.S. Department of State, 2012). 
Nigeria’s cooperation with foreign governments in arresting and prosecuting terrorists led to the prosecution of 
Umar Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian National who tried to detonate explosive aboard flight in 2009.   Henry Okah, a 
Nigerian oil militant was also prosecuted on 13 charges of terrorism, including organizing twin car bombings 
that killed at least 12 people and got about 36 people wounded during Nigeria’s 2010 Independence Day 
celebrations (BBC News, 2013). 
 
The present Buhari’s administration have no significant changes to Nigeria’s counterterrorism legal framework and 
other criminal justice approaches since 2015. Remarkable prosecution during this administration include prosecution 
of suspected terrorists and their supporters. About 1,660 suspected supporters of Boko Haram and Islam State of Irag 
and Syria – West Africa were arrested and 366 were convicted for terrorism-related offenses. Some of the cases were 
dismissed for lack of evidence and others remained in custody. Notably, Haruna Yahaya and Banzana Yusuf, were 
convicted and sentenced to years of imprisonment for involvement in the kidnapping of about 300 Chibok secondary 
school girls (United States Department of State, 2019).  
 
3.3. The Conciliatory Model 
The conciliatory model is based on soft power approaches to address grievances. Its strategies involve peaceful 
negotiations, capacity building, democratization, economic development, political dialogue, amnesty, 
community empowerment, conflict management, de-radicalization and rehabilitation programs that focus on 
investigating the underlying causes of terrorism (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Oyewole, 2013).  The model 
responds to terrorism by focusing on collaboration with groups rather than specific individuals contrary to the 
criminal justice model. It is a non-overly military approach that seeks to address the underlying factors 
responsible for radicalization and terrorism through dialogues and negotiation (Murtala, 2020). According to 
Sederberg (2003), the primary target for any counterterrorism policy is compromise and conciliation between the 
government and the insurgents. In support of Sederberg’s (2003) assertions, Hersey and Hauss (2003, as cited in 
Hauss) posited that governments need to use the tools developed by conflict resolution professionals including 
empathic listening, reassessment, dialogue, analytical problem solving, and partnership building to address the 
underlying causes of terrorism. Thus, governments can win the battle against insurgency to a great extent by 
approaching terrorists’ elements with negotiation, conciliatory tone and consistent actions to influence terrorists’ 
behavior (Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Neumann, 2007). 
 
The Nigerian government has slightly extended its counter terrorism tactics to include the conciliatory approach, 
which is basically more civilized, involves dialogue and the principles of restorative justice where the needs of 
the victim, community and offender are put into consideration. It involves initiating political dialogue with all 
stakeholders and addressing the root causes of terrorism (Omede, 2011). President Shehu Shagari established a 
Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Justice Aniagolua to investigate the causes of terrorist 
violence after the Maitatsine sectarian violence in the 1980s (Danjibo, 2009). President Umaru Musa Yar’dua 
granted amnesty under the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs to Niger Delta 
militants. These programs extended government spending on socioeconomic empowerment and rehabilitation 
programs. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo also engaged the conciliatory approach through dialogue and 
negotiation with Boko Haram members in 2011. He demanded a ceasefire from both the military and the sect 
and offered an end to the killings of sect members. Obasanjo offered compensation to the victims and families of 
sect members killed by government security personnel, and to hold police officers accountable for the killing of 
the group’s leader (Agbiboa, 2013a).  
 
Under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, the president formed various committees to examine 
the causes of violent and proffer solutions. The Presidential Committee on Security Challenges was created in 
2011 to initiate negotiations with Boko Haram; The Gamji fact-finding Committee was established in 2011 and 
the Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of Security Challenges in the North, was created in 2013 to 
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identify the structural grievances of the sect, create effective framework for implementation of amnesty and 
demobilization of the group, and possibly recommend ways to improve security in the North-East region 
(Solomon, 2012; Thurston, 2013). The committee recommended for establishment of an advisory group for 
dialogue with Boko Haram and to set up victims’ support fund that would help to alleviate pains of victimization 
(Nwankpa, 2014). However, the government declined to compensate victims of Boko Haram attacks, with plans 
of creating other assistance programs (ThisDay, 2013). The leader of Boko Haram also declined amnesty from 
government and vowed to heightened violent campaigns, bombing attacks and assassinations in Nigeria 
(Agbiboa, 2013b).  
 
Buhari’s administration also intensified conciliatory efforts by launching a program to de-radicalize youths 
(Tella, 2018). The program kicked off in vulnerable communities in the North and in displaced persons camps. 
Other programs to rehabilitate and reintegrate repented and convicted terrorists were also set in place in various 
correctional facilities. The programs empowered participants through vocational training, education and skill 
acquisition outfits. Notable programs include the “Operation Safe Corridor” and “Yellow Ribbon Initiative”, 
provided by the Neem Foundation since 2017. The Initiative was set up to rehabilitate and reintegrate women, 
children and other vulnerable youths (Adibe, 2020). Some these repentant terrorists successfully completed the 
rehabilitation program and reintegrate into their communities.  
 
 
Table 1. Models of Counter-terrorism Responses 
Models Key Features Strategy Target Result 
Military Hard power, war-like 
tactics, retaliatory strikes, 
profiling, intelligence,  
target hardening, 
assassinations, violation 
of human rights  
Repressive Group (offenders/ 
terrorists) 
Violence and more 
violence, fatalities, 







rules of evidence, 
democratic, extradition, 
respect for human rights, 
deterrence 
























restored, likely long 
term terror reduction 
Adapted from Bhoumik (2005); Perlinger 2012; Crelinsten, 2014; author’s own elaboration from literature. 
 
4. Addressing Terrorism with Restorative Justice 
The conciliatory model incorporates the principles of restorative justice in justice administration. Among the 
three models of the counter terrorism strategies, the Nigerian government has largely engaged the military war 
model which to a great extent has not helped to reduce the scourge of terrorism in Nigeria but rather exacerbated 
the indices of terrorists’ attacks. According to research and as cited above, the war model has never provided a 
long-term solution to the problem of terrorism (Crelinsten, 2014). There is need to examine the structural factors 
that contribute to the ease of radicalization and its attendant consequences. Understandably, it is the 
Government’s duty to provide security in the country and prosecute criminals, however its excessive focus on 
solely hunting down terrorists has given rise to the following questions: Can the killing of terrorists or 
incarceration restore the psychosocial needs of those victimized in terrorists’ attacks or is there need for 
reparation? Are there other stakeholders impacted by terrorism in Nigeria? Should government continue to be 
silent over the pains of victims and communities or ignore it in line with the culture of punishing offenders only 
without paying attention to those that may have been victimized in the process? Does incarceration or execution 
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truly hold the terrorists accountable for kidnappings, displacement of indigenes, killing of innocent citizens, 
destruction of properties, rape, infanticides, and genocide of certain ethnic group? 
 
5. Conceptual and Theoretical Framing of Restorative Justice 
Marshall (1999) defines RJ as a “process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come 
together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the future” 
(p. 23). Marshall’s definition tend to restrict RJ’s proceedings and participation to only offender, victim and 
possibly mediators. In support of Marshall’s analysis, Maglione (2020) emphasized that the framework of 
restorative justice must involve victims, offenders and their communities who must engage in productive 
dialogue that would result to reparation and psychological healing. However, Shapland et al., (2006) argued that 
restorative justice proceedings involve more than participation of victim, offender and possible others (e.g., 
facilitator or mediator); it also involve conferencing with offender’s and victim’s supporters. Parties come 
together to share and resolve issues through the values of cooperation, healing, active participation, truth-telling, 
experience sharing, mutual care, reconciliation, and peacemaking. RJ responds to crime by taking steps to repair 
harm by involving all stakeholders, restore sense of autonomy and prevent feeling of powerlessness on victims.  
Under this process victims are not marginalized nor ignored to wallow in pains. The focus is on repairing the 
wrongdoing and reintegrating the offender into a community of good citizens. Evidence shows that restorative 
justice fosters reconciliation in post-conflict societies like in England and Wales (Maglione, 2020). 
 
The restorative justice philosophy is centered on the fact that victims become powerless as a result of 
victimization suffered in the hands of offenders and community is affected as victims are part of the community, 
“where it bleeds, it hurts”. Therefore crime is harmful to both the victim and the community, offenders must be 
held accountable. The victim, offender and community have psychosocial needs that must be managed through 
active participation in mediation and reconciliation. To complete the reconciliation process, offenders must 
apologize and express remorse for their actions against the victim and the community (Braithwaite, 1998; 
Shapland et al., 2006). 
 
Table 2: Psychosocial needs of Victim, Offender & Community resulting from Crimes/Terrorism 
Victim's Psychosocial Needs 
Community's Psychosocial 
Needs Offender's Psychosocial Needs 
 Dealing with loss of loved 
one 
 Dealing with loss of its 
members  Intrinsic accountability 
 Dealing with loss of 
property 
 Dealing with loss of 
property 
 Pardon from victim(s) or 
survivors 
 Trauma associated with 
terrorist attacks 
 Struggling with reality 
of its losses  Facing his or her new reality 
 Post-traumatic stress 
disorder 
 Economic and social 
stability 
 Adjusting to post-crime prison 
life 
 Fear of future 
victimization 
 Reentry challenges for 
offender 
 Dealing with broken 
connections 
 Need for offender to feel 
victim's humanity 
 Dealing with drift of 
members 
 Identifying cause of 
crime/terrorism  
 Need to reclaim power 
 Terrorism as a 
symptom of societal 
failures 
 Accepting crime/terrorism as 
sign of unresolved issues 
 Need for closure 
 
 Challenges of reentry 
Adapted from Obi, Okoye, Ewoh, & Onwudiwe, (2018, p. 10); author’s own elaboration from literature. 
 
Criminological theories can provide the context for explaining and understanding restorative justice. RJ has 
strong theoretical connections to Braithwaite’s (1989) re-integrative shaming and peacemaking criminology 
(Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1985; Quinney, 1988). According to Braithwaite (1989), crime is best resolved and 
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prevented when members of the community are actively involved in shaming offenders and reintegrating them 
into the community, with emphasis on conciliatory gestures and forgiveness (Williams & McShane, 2010). 
Peacemaking criminology also focuses on collaboration and cooperation between the victim, offender, and 
community to hinder crime and encourage interpersonal relationships, security, peace, and order in the society 
rather than punishment (Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1985; Quinney, 1988). Sherman and Strang (2007) reviewed 36 
cases on the effectiveness of RJ in the UK, Canada and some parts of the United States. Results indicated 
substantial reductions in recidivism for both violent and property crimes, though consistently better with violent 
crimes.  Further analysis show that RJ is also more effective with crimes involving personal victims than for 
crimes without them and thus is applicable to terrorism. RJ also reduces post-traumatic stress, related costs of 
prosecution, and desire for intense revenge or identity switch. 
 
5.1. Elements of Restorative Justice 
 
Figure 2. Core Elements of Restorative Justice. Adapted from Miers, et al., (2001); Maglione, (2020). 
 
The philosophical elements of Restorative Justice are interconnected in a circle of justice and can be summarized 
in three R’s: Responsibility, Restoration and Reintegration (Miers et al. 2001). It provides for offenders’ 
accountability by encouraging offenders such as terrorists to take personal responsibility for acts of killings, 
arson, demolition of properties, rape, hostage taking and kidnappings. Restorative justice addresses the root 
causes of terrorism such as religious extremism, bad government, socio-economic marginalization, poverty, 
unemployment, economic marginalization, power struggle, lack of education, advancement in technology 
(Crelinstein, 2014; Rapoport, 1984; Omede, 2011; Crenshaw, 1981). It embraces mediation, peace keeping, 
cooperation, reconciliation, repairing harm and rebuilding relationships rather than coercion and retribution. As 
provided above, it empowers victims and affected community through the process of justice and show equivalent 
concern for their needs. All stakeholders including family members of terrorists’ victims, bereaved family 
members and all others affected by terrorism attacks have equal opportunity to dialogue with victims, offenders 
and mediators. It is expected that the outcome will repair wrongs and reintegrate offenders (terrorists).  
 
Historically, restorative justice is rooted in the healing practices in ancient societies where members of the 
community develop acceptable strategies that would equitably restore justice through restitutions and reparations 
(Braithwaite, 1999). The practice of restorative justice and re-integrative shaming is in pari materia with the 
doctrine of “Amala-to-cracy”. Amalatocracy is an Igbo customary jurisprudence derived from the Igbo (eastern 
part of Nigeria) and Greek languages. Where Amala signifies the true sons and daughters of the land (Ala), and 
cracy originated from the Greek word kratos, which signifies to rule. Amalatocracy literally refers to the 
customary democratic system of dispute resolution accustomed to the local customs and traditions of the people, 
some versions of this primordial judicial system of dispute settlement are seen among other ethnic groups in 
Nigeria (Onwudiwe, Okoye, Obi & Oludare, 2015).  
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Amalatocracy is the concept of justice administration involving members of the community as the judicial 
committees, which is composed of the Family heads, Elders, Umunna (kinsmen), Umuada (daughters of the 
land), Out-ogbo (Age grade) and/or the Eze in-council. This committee can equitably adjudicate disputes based 
on the needs of the community and the victim. The principle of Amalatocracy is based on the framework that 
justice belongs to the people, administered by the people, and for the good of the people. In Amalatocratic 
practice, the essence of shaming the offender is to make that person repent and refrain from engaging in further 
violations of rules and regulations that govern the integrity of the community. Shaming also helps the 
community to achieve deterrent effects as indigenes who observed the process of shaming others will be 
dissuaded from committing the same or similar crimes in the future.  Oko (2006: xv) posited that in the Afikpo 
model of Amalatocracy, “restoring the victim’s emotional and material losses is the goal of justice.”  
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Plethora of studies concluded that Nigerian government cannot stop terrorist activities using repressive measures 
only. Terrorists have the tendency to elude repressive measures in the long run by engaging new strategies that 
would lead to a cycle of violence (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Crelinstein, 2014; Onapajo, & Ozden, 2020). 
According to Sederberg (1995), conceptualizing terrorism as war results to responding to terrorism with the war 
approach; viewing it as a crime results to criminal justice measures and commitment to the rule of law; and 
viewing terrorism from a soft perspective leads to a more conciliatory approach imbibed in the tenets of 
restorative justice and democratic principles. In developing counterterrorist strategies, it is important to note the 
fragility and vicious ethnic rivalries affecting Nigeria as a nation. For the state to survive as one nation, the 
government must emphasize negotiations with terrorists rather than using the war approach. Obviously, efforts to 
exterminate any part of the nation will threaten its survival.  
 
To frontally win the war against terrorism, the Nigerian government must develop and implement sustainable 
counterterrorism strategies that addresses the grievances and feelings of deprivation and societal dynamics that 
extremist recruiters use to radicalize youths. Essentially, such strategy must incorporate the principles of 
restorative justice and peacemaking ideologies. Restorative justice is a component of conciliatory 
counterterrorist model and involves stakeholders’ active participation in resolving issues through the values of 
mediation, negotiation, cooperation, peacemaking, healing, and reconciliation (Elechi, 1999). The focus is on 
transforming the traditional relationship between communities and their governments; repairing wrongdoing; 
reintegrating offenders into the community; promote interpersonal relationships, security, peace and order in the 
society rather than punishment (Pepinsky & Jesilow, 1985; Quinney, 1988). As earlier stated, the conciliatory 
approach could be achieved by rehabilitating terrorists to become good citizens through empowerment programs, 
training, counseling, and treatment. Rehabilitation of terrorists would help to change radicalization views and 
lifestyles, thereby encourage terrorists to desist from engaging in terrorist activities (Marie-Helen, 2013).  
 
Socioeconomic empowerment is a conciliatory counterterrorism model proven to have a strong negative 
relationship with terrorism incidents in Nigeria. This model was adopted in 2009 to counter the terrorism effects 
of the Niger-Delta militants (Abdallah, 2012). Result shows drastic reduction in terrorism incidents resulting 
from the Niger-Delta militancy in 2009 due to the empowerment programs in place (Ikelegbe, 2010). However, 
it is important to note that the Boko Haram phenomenon started in 2009 and may have generally affected 
terrorism incidents in Nigeria that year. This outcome corroborated with the findings in Bueno de Mesquita 
(2005), Dugan and Chenoweth (2012), and Sederberg (1995), that conciliatory approaches are effective in 
reducing terrorism.  
 
The psychosocial needs of the community, terrorists and especially the victims of terrorist attacks must be 
paramount for effective process. Most of these victims, suffered injuries, lost family members, raped, displaced, 
lost properties. Ignoring the psychosocial needs of the victims may result to adoption of violent life style in the 
long run due to past victimizations. Thereby leading to what is referred to as a “turning point or identity role 
switch”; that is switching from victims to perpetrators of terrorist violence (Sutterluty, 2007). Many of these 
victims had experienced grave violence and terrorists attacks against them, their family members and friends 
which may have resulted to feeling of powerlessness and they may resort to violence in an attempt to reclaim 
power. 
 
Hewitt (1984), argues that the most effective counterterrorist strategies involve a combination of synchronized 
policies based on country’s unique circumstances. The operational conception of terrorism in Nigeria is highly 
loaded politically. Various terrorists groups in Nigeria like the Boko Haram, Niger Delta Militants, Fulani 
Herdsmen are all ethnic groups that feel politically and economically marginalized.  Therefore, these terrorists 
groups unleash violence as a way to negotiate access to political power and/or economic resources.  Studies 
Public Policy and Administration Research                                                                                                                                       www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5731(Paper) ISSN 2225-0972(Online)  
Vol.11, No.4, 2021 
 
84 
show that these remain a major cause of political and religious conflict in Nigeria. Obviously, terrorism in 
Nigeria is a form of political resistance against domination by another ethnic group. The author hereby argues 
that negotiated settlements, conciliation, mediation and restitution are better strategies to resolve the nature of 
terrorism in Nigeria. However, the use of military tactics should be employed mildly with caution, used only as 
an immediate response strategy when the threat is enormous and uncontrollable (Crelinsten & Schmid, 1993).  
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